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most fr  qu  ntly  put,  in  oth  r countri  s,  about th  six-nation  Europ  an  Community. 
A  variant which  we g  t  v  n  from  some  of th  Common  Mark  t's best friends  is: 
'We are all in favour of the Community, but why is  it becoming  protectionist?' 
The answer to both questions is, quite simply, that the Common Mark  t is  n  ith .r 
inward looking nor protectionist. I believe the Common Market, in the last f  w years, 
has done enough to reduce trade barriers to  make its character and  intentions quite 
cl.ear.  But since the questions are asked, they need answering in  detail. This is what 
this brief paper sets out to do. 
The Community -
the vvorld's biggest customer 
There are two  ways  of deciding whether· the Common Market is inward or outward looking, liberal 
or protectionist. The first is to analyze the development of trade  between  the  Common Market and 
the  rest of  the world.  The other is  to examine how the Community's external tariff is taking shape, 
and to  decide  whether it is  a  high  tariff compared  with  the  tariffs  of  other  major  industrialized 
countries. 
The  Common  Market  is  the  world's  biggest  importer.  Its  imports  from  non-member  countries 
were  valued at $24·6 billion in  1963, compared with imports worth about $17 billion by the United 
States.  The  Community's  purchases  of  goods  from the rest of the world rose by about 52 per cent 
between  1958  and 1963, while American and British  imports  increased  by  much  less  - by  28  per 
cent and 29  per cent respectively. 
What  about  the  Community's exports?  Between  1958  and  1963  they rose  by about 37 per cent. 
But as imports expanded by 52 per cent in the same  period,  the  Community  has  been faced  with 
an increasingly large trade deficit with the rest of the  world.  In 1958  this  deficit  was  very  small -
some  $245  million.  In 1963  it reached $3,000 million - a twelve-fold increase in five  years. 
Allowing for  other foreign  receipts  and expenditures besides those resulting from  trade in goods, 
the  Community's  balance  on  current account deteriorated  from  a  large  surplus  of  $3,500  million 
in  1959  to  a  small  deficit  in  1963.  In  1964,  the  deficit  is  likely  to  amount  to  several  hundred 
million  dollars. 
Naturally  this  development  is  causing concern.  Highly industrialized countries,  such  as  those  of 
the  Common Market, must earn a surplus on current account if they  are to  provide  an increasing 
amount of  aid for  the developing countries and if they are to export capital on a long-term basis. 
Several Community countries must make difficult decisions this year if they are to stop the deteriora-
tion in their external financial  position. The Community policy on inflation, drafted by the Common 
Market Commission and adopted in April 1964 by  the  Council  of  Ministers,  and  the  decision  to 
work  out  our medium-term  economic  policies  together,  should  help  us  over  these  difficulties. 
Of  course,  the  Community  has  benefited,  and  is  still  benefiting,  from  a  substantial  influx  of 
foreign  capital.  But a large part of this capital consists  of short-term investment of a highly vola-
tile character. The direction of such capital flows can change overnight, and it is not very comforting 
to  spend more  than your income  and  to  borrow short-term to fill  the  gap. 
The United States and Great Britain 
With  European-American  trade  and  American  fears  for  its  future  so  much  in  the  limelight  in 
Geneva and elsewhere, it is  worth taking a look at the facts  of the matter in some detail. In 1963 
Community imports  from  the United States were  valued  at  roughly  $5  billion,  an increase  of  no 
less  than 80  per cent over the  1958 figure.  Community  exports  to  the  United  States  increased  by 
54 per cent compared with  1958, but still amounted to  only  $2·6 billion.  As a result,  the Common 
Market's trade  deficit  with  the  United States  rose  from  $1·2 billion in  1958  to about $2·5  billion 
last year. The Community buys twice as much from  the  United States as  it sells  there. 
2 American  exports to Britain  rose  between  1958  and  1963  by  34  per cent,  while  US  exports  to 
the  EFT  A  countries as  a group rose by 41  per cent. 
The Community's imports have increased in even  more  striking  fashion  from  some  other coun-
tries, notably Great Britain. Purchases from  Britain rose  by  105  per cent -from $1,192  million to 
$2,446- in five  years; while Community exports to  Britain  during  the  same  period  increased  by 
less  than 49  per cent - from  $1,330  to $1,977.  During  these  same  five  years,  imports  from  Latin 
America  increased  by  35  per cent,  while  exports to the area rose by only 10 per cent. At the same 
time,  the  Community's  total  imports  from  developing  countries  in  general  rose  by  19  per cent, 
while  its  exports  to  them remained stationary. 
To avoid any misunderstanding, I want to make it clear that I do not consider these developments 
as  having been damaging to the financial balance of the free  world.  The increase in the American 
trade surplus has helped the Western partner in the Atlantic Alliance, at a difficult time, to face its 
formidable responsibilities for the defence of the· free  world and has compensated to some extent for 
a  larger outflow  of capital.  But obviously,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  the. European  trade 
deficit cannot be allowed to deteriorate much further.  and the  Community  hopes  that  the  United 
States will find  ways  to expand their own imports more rapidly, at the same time as they take steps 
to  check  their exports  of  capital. 
A  liberal trade policy 
What are the reasons for this increase in the Community's imports ? First· of all, the Common Market 
countries have been enjoying a boom for several years past. Prosperity and buying power have been 
increasing rapidly.  The economic unification of Europe has made an important contribution tothis 
prosperity  and to  the consequent increase  in imports. 
But, in addition, the Community ·trade and tariff policy has been liberal. In our trade with other 
countries  with  similar economies,  quantitative restrictions  on  industrial  goods  have  been  virtually 
abolished. 
Our  Common  External  Tariff,  even  as  it  was  originally  envisaged,  represented  on  average  a 
much  lower level  of protection than the  former  national  tariffs.  Adjustments  resulting  from  com-
pensation to our partners in GATT (the General Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade)  and from  the 
Dillon Round of tariff negotiations have further reduced the external tariff. so  that it is  now lower, 
on average, than both the  British and the American tariffs. 
Furthermore, in 1960 the Common  Market provisionally  and unilaterally  lowered  its  tariffs  on 
industrial  products  by  20  per cent,  expecting  that  the  Dillon  Round  negotiation  would  make  it 
possible  to confirm  this  reduction.  Although the Dillon  Round did not  achieve  all  the  reductions 
hoped for, we  have kept the reduction in force in expectation of the results of the Kennedy Round 
negotiations  which  began  officially  in May  1964. 
There is  thus  nothing  inward-looking  or protectionist about the  Common Market's record.  For 
the past, the facts  speak for  themselves;  for the future, we  have no intention of changing the open, 
liberal policies we have followed so far and which have given such a sharp stimulus to liberal trade 
policies  and the  lowering  of trade  barriers  throughout the world. 
The Community In the Kennedy Round 
It is  inevitable  that, from  time  to  time,  balance-of-payments problems will emerge in  one  part or 
other  of  the  free  world.  This  should  not deter  us  from  working  relentlessly  towards  a  gradual 
reduction of the trade barriers that still exist - both tariff  and non-tariff. 
The Kennedy Round negotiations in GATT present us with the greatest opportunity we  have yet 
had to reduce world trade barriers.  The inspiration for  the US  Trade Expansion Act of  1962, ·on 
which  the  United States'  tariff-cutting  mandate in these  negotiations is  founded,  derives  from  the 
unanimous recognition by the GATT Contracting Parties in November 1961 of the need to adopt new 
methods  for  reducing  customs  duties  and,  in particular,  the  linear,  or  across·the-board,  formula 
already adopted in  the Common Market. 
Before  the  1962  Act,  the  United States  had no  possibility  of changing  the  traditional  tedious, 
product-by-product methods  of negotiating tariff cuts.  The United States deserve tribute for having 
passed the legislation needed to give their Administration new powers- to cut tariffs by 50 per cent, 
and even abolish them on some items - which no US  Administration· had previously possessed. This 
is  a positive  and direct result of fruitful confrontation  of  methods  between  America  and Europe. 
3 The Community  does  not look upon the  Kennedy  Round - or any similar effort towards  trade 
liberalization - as  a means  to  give  one country or trading bloc an advantage over its competitors. 
It looks upon it as  an opportunity to bring about a better division of labour among all the nations 
concerned,  a more  rapid increase  in productivity, a  faster  rise  in  the  standard of living - in both 
developed  and developing  countries - and an opportunity  to  give  freer  play  to the  forces  of fair 
competition.  These  are the most powerful factors  in economic  progress  . 
. The European Community is  fully  committed to making the Kennedy Round a success. From the 
start,  the  Common  Market  has  supported  the  principle  of  major cuts  in  customs  duties  and the 
removal  of  as  many non-tariff barriers as  possible. 
In full  agreement with  the United States, Great Britain and other countries, the Community has 
maintained that the negotiations should aim at complete  reciprocity  in  the  concessions  which  they 
are called on to make. It is  not always easy, however,  to work  out this  principle  of  reciprocity  in 
practice and it is  natural that from  time  to time,  in  the  course  of  the  discussions,  differences  of 
opinion  should arise  among  even  the  closest  partners.  These  differences  should not be exaggerated 
or dramatized. I have no doubt that within the next year or so  we  shall reach a full  understanding. 
The 'disparities• question 
One  of  the  difficulties  now  receiving  attention  springs  from  the  very  different  structures  of  the 
American,  British  and  Common  Markef tariffs.  This  is  the  so-called  "disparities"  problem. 
The  Common  Market's industrial  tariff  consists  of  low  and  moderately  high  duties,  with  only 
23  tariff positions  above  25  per· cent - and with only  six  tariff  positions  above  30  per cent. 
If we  analyze  the  American  tariff - which  has  about  twice  as  many  positions  as  the  Common 
Market tariff - we  discover that it includes, along with a substantial number of zero and low duties, 
a great proportion of high duties. The US  tariff has  524 positions between 25  and 30 per cent,  386 
between  30  and  35  per cent and as  many as  427  above  35  per cent.  Some  go  above ·  45 · and even 
50  per cent. 
The  British  tariff presents  a fairly  high number of duties  of 20,  25,  30  and  33  per cent. 
The  difficulties  arising  from  this  situation  were  acknowledged  at Geneva  in  May  1963  by  all 
GATT members.  It is  obvious  that an across-the-board cut of 50 per cent (or of any percentage) on 
all  duties would not bring about the full  reciprocity we  all seek. If 50 per cent cuts were made, the 
Common  Market  tariff  would  then consist  mainly  of  duties  below  10  per cent,  plus  a  couple  of 
hundred  between  10  and  15  per cent,  while  the  US  tariff  would  still  include  many  tariffs  above 
15  per cent and a substantial number above 20 and even  25  per cent. 
How can this problem be dealt with? An obvious way  out would  be  to  cut high  duties by more 
than  50  per cent.  All ·duties  would  then  be  cut by .  at least  50  per cent  and some  by  more  than 
50  per cent.  But this is  excluded by  the  provisions  of the  US  Trade  Expansion  Act. 
The alternative solution is to make smaller reductions in lower duties- that is, when the existence 
of· a  significant  disparity is  recognized.  It is  along  these  lines  that we  are  looking  for  an answer, 
and  the  Common  Market  has  put  forward  a ·proposal  which  we  think  is  fair  and  equitable.  It 
would  retain  only  some  of the  disparities which  a  comparison  of  US,  UK  and  Common  Market 
tariffs  reveals. 
Of course, the number of disparities which would have to be corrected may still appear too high 
to  some  people,  though  they  are far less  numerous  than has  sometimes  been claimed.  The reason 
for this does not lie in the proposed rules, which are liberal, but in the widely  diverging  structures 
of the  tariffs  involved. 
The  Community  also  recognizes  that the  problem  of disparities  is  of  great  importance  to  the 
smaller  European countries  - in particular Switzerland - who  are  the main  suppliers  of  some  of 
the  items for which  the US  has high  tariffs;  these items might come under the rules for disparities 
and the Community's tariff on  them might consequently not be  subject to  a  50  per cent cut.  The 
Common· Market hopes  to be able  to work out a  solution  to  this ·problem  which  will  take  into 
account the interest of the small· European countries  in  securing  the  maximum  tariff cuts  on  their 
main  export  products. 
Agriculture a  special probletn 
The  disparities  question  illustrates  the  complexity  and  difficulty  of the  negotiation we  are  under-
taking. It also  shows  that such complexities and difficulties  can  be  overcome  among  friends  who 
are  committed  to  similar  aims. 
4 Agriculture is  another great problem of the Kennedy Round. All countries of the free world tend 
to  protect  their farmers  in varying  degrees. 
Here  the  Common  Market has  proposed  a  new  approach  for  the  negotiations : 
The  total level  of protection  afforded  by  each  country  to  its ·farmers  (including  subsidies  and 
export rebates,  and not just tariffs  and other conventional  trade  barriers)  should  be  taken  into 
account; 
World-wide commodity agreements should be negotiated as  a means of rationalizing the markets · 
of certain important foodstuffs. 
The Co~nrnunity  and Atlantic 
partnership 
People  in the European Community feel  that they are involved in one  of the greatest and boldest 
enterprises  of  modem times.  They  are  working  toward  the ·fusion  - the  peaceful  fusion  - of  six 
fully  developed  national  economies,  which  are,  taken  together,  comparable  in  population  and 
production to  the  United States.  Carrying out this  enterprise  is  bound  to  bring  about  changes  in 
traditional  relationships  between Europe  and the  rest  of  the  world.  It is  one  thing  to  deal  with 
six  small or medium-sized countries; it is quite another to deal with a unit of the Common Market's 
magnitude. 
The Community is  aware of the difficulties  which  its  unification creates for  other countries  and 
of the  added responsibilities which this imposes upon it. It is  vital, if the Community is  to achieve 
mutual  understanding  with  its  partners  in  the  free  world,  that the  details  should  not be  allowed 
to  obscure  the essential  facts~ 
Partly  as  a  result  of American  encouragement  and  help,  the  Common  Market is  no  longer  a 
dream,  but an indestructible  reality.  It has a momentum of its own: the customs union is  already 
developing  into  full  economic  union;  the  economic  union  will  in  tum develop  towards  political 
union. 
The figures  quoted  earlier indicate that, during  the  first  six  years  of its  existence,  the  Common 
Market has been a cause of economic progress, not only in the six  countries directly involved,  but 
also in the free  world as  a whole.  We  should all be worse  off  if it had not come into being. 
The reasons  which  prompted the United States,  20  years  ago,  to support the idea of European 
unification have lost none of their force.  The most important among them is the realization that the 
prosperity,  and  perhaps  even  the  survival,  of  the  free  world  requires  close  and  full  partnership 
between  a  strong  Europe and  a  strong United States. 
Signs  of this  partnership are already emerging.  The United States made a major contribution to 
the  rebuilding  of Western  Europe in the post-war  years.  More recently,  on  a  more  modest  scale, 
European countries have accumulated large dollar balances to give  the United States time to solve 
its  balance-of-payments  difficulties.  The  United  States  would  undoubtedly  do  the  same  for  its 
European  partners  in  a  similar  situation.  In such  ways  as  this,  and  in other ways,  too,  we  can 
do  a  great  deal  together  to  ensure  healthy,  steady  economic  expansion  and  financial  stability 
throughout the world. The partnership is developing, and will go on developing, if we  do not falter 
in  our resolve  and in our efforts until it is fully  achieved. 
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GotTrrTtr.rraity, US and Ul(
tariffs corrrpared
UK tariff  lrlghest,  Gornnrunlty's  lowest
The Community's common external  tariff is lower on
average than either the British or American tarift, it
varies between smaller  limits, and includes fewer very
high peaks, according to a recent study by Marcel
Mesnage of the European  Community  Statistical Office.
An equal 50% cut of all duties in the three systems
would therefore  leave many US and UK tariffs at a high
level, while reducing the bulk of Community  tariffs to
negligible proportions.
Comparison of the simple averages of all tarifts on
industrial products in the Community,  the US and the
UK shows that the UK maintained  the highest overall
level of protection  - 18.4%, compared  with 17.8o1in  the
US and 11.7% in the Community. M. Mesnage  rejects
the use of weighted averages  (based on the relative
importance  of individual items in a country's total
imports)on  the grounds thatthe results are misleading
because the level of a tariff itself has an effect on the
'weight'-that  is, on the level of imports of the item
concerned. A high duty may substantially  reduce or
even totally exclude imports of a particular item, yet in
a weighted  average  the greater its protective  effect the
less impression it makes on the final results. M. Mes-
nage therefore prefers to use simple, arithmetical
averages in his calculations, as these, he feels, do not
disguise the inhibiting effects which high tariffs may
have on trade flows.
Chart 1 shows the distribution  of US and UK tariffs
compared  with the Community's common external
tariff. Community tariffs are the most concentrated,
with 80ft of all duties between 4 and 19f. British tariffs
tend to be concentrated around the 10, 20 and 30%
levels, thus giving the graph three separate peaks.
American  tariffs vary the most widely, with slightly  more
zero or low duties than the other two, but also with more
very high duties. The proportion  of zero tariffs is virtually
the same in all three cases: 8ol tn the Community  and
the UK and 10% in the US.
One of the Community's  major proposals for the
conduct of the forthcoming  negotiations is that where
two countries' tariffs for the same item differ by more
than 10 percentage  points,  the otherwise agreed 'across-
the-board' method of equal percentage cuts should be
abandoned in favour of special measures  that would
reduce all parties' tariffs to approximately  the same
final levels. The extent of this problem is brought out
by M. Mesnage's  analysis, which shows that between
the Community and the US there is a difference  of 10
or more points tor 30Yo of all items, and between the
Community and the UK for 31/o of all items. ln prac-
tically all cases these high 'peak' duties occur in the
US and British tariffs and not in the Community  tariff.
Chart 2 shows the differences  in average tarift levels
for major categories  of products.  As would be expected
in industrialized economies, all three tarifts - Com-
munity, UK and US - tend to belowest  for raw materials,
rising through semi-finished  goods to the highest
levels on finished manufactured  items. As a result there
is a comparable  order of magnitude  between the three
tariffs: where one country has a high tariff in a partic-
ular product category,  the other countries' tariffs also
tend to be relatively high. For raw materials and energy
products,  the most common  single duty level in all
three systems is zero - being applied in 74ft of cases
in the Community tarift and in 46% of cases in both the
US and UK tariffs.
1. Where most of the tarifis lie: comparative frequency of tariff levels
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External trade statistics 
Note: The source of tables 1, 2, 4 and 5 
Is the European Community Statistical Office, 
referred to in the tables as ECSO 
1. The vvorld's chief trading areas 
$millions 
1958  1962 
Increase  Percentage 
%  of world 
1958-62  totals (1962) 
Imports 
European Community (1)  16,156  22,327  38  18.9 
us  13,208  16,240  23  13.7 
UK  10,488  12,578  20  10.6 
Latin America  8,530  8,840  0.4  7.5 
Canada  5,351  5,852  9  5.0 
Japan  3,033  5,636  86  4.8 
USSR  4,350  6,450  48  5.5 
World (2)  94,500  118,300  25  100.0 
Exports 
us  17,751  21,285  20  19.3 
European Community (1)  15,911  20,638  30  18.7 
UK  9,276  11,059  19  10.0 
Latin America  8,170  9,200  13  8.4 
USSR  4,298  7,034  64  6.4 
Canada  5,080  5,933  18  5.4 
Japan  2,877  4,918  71  4.5 
World (2)  88,900  110,100  24  100.0 
(1)  Intra-Community trade excluded 
(2)  Soviet bloc and intra-Community trade excluded. 
Source: ECSO monthly external-trade statistics, issue No. 11/1963. 
8 2. An open Cornrnun·lty -
and opening vvlder still 
Community, UK, US and Soviet shares in world imports 1958•1963 
PROPORTION OF WORLD TOTAl 
Total world 
Year  imports  European  UK  U·S 
($millions)  Community 
1958  94,500  17.1%  11.1%  14.0% 
1961  112,200  18.2%  11.0%  13.0% 
1962  118,200  18.9%  10.6%  13.7% 
1st half 1962  58,600  19.1%  10.8%  13.6% 
1st half 1963  .60,800  19.8%  10.8%  13.4% 
Source: ECSO. 
USSR 
4.6% 
5.2% 
5.5% 
3. Hovv other countries' exports to the 
Community have risen, 1958·19&2 
With comparisons of their export performance to the rest of the world 
EXPORTS TO THE COMMUNITY  EXPORTS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD 
Change% 
Countries or areas  1958  1962  1958-62  1958 
T  tal f  r all non-member countries 
t  g  th  r  14,080  19,560  +  39  70,035 
lndustrializ  d countries  7,773  11,460  +147  39,573 
us  2,400  3,590  +50  15,332 
Canada  436  430  - 1  4,613 
EFTA  3,559  5,350  +50  12,179 
Other countries in  Western Europe  681  1,050  +54  1,920 
Other Industrialized countries'  697  1,040  +  49  5,529 
Dev  loping c  untries  5,513  6,845  +  24  19,183 
latin America  ·t,320  1,810  +  37  6,878 
Middle East2  1,360  1,620  +  19  3,316 
Other African countries  2,003  2,318*  +  16  1,858 
Other countries in Asia and Oceania  830  1,097  +  32  7,131 
East  rn bloc  794  1,255  +  58  11,279 
Eastern Europe  697  1,170  +  68  9,406 
•  Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Africa. 
2Aden, Cyprus, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, lebanon, Syria, libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt. 
*Including estimated North African exports to the Community in 1962. 
Source: United Nations Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 1961  and June 1963. 
Change% 
1962  1958-62 
86,840  +24 
48,830  +23 
17,780  +16 
5,500  +19 
14,670  +21 
2,660  +39 
8,220  +49 
22,195  +16 
7,390  +7 
4,180  +26 
2,262  +22 
8,363  +17 
15,815  +40 
14,500  +54 
9 4. The Comrnunity as  a major  customer 
Exports of countries which sent more than 20% of th  ir exports 
to the Community in 1958. 
Exports to European 
Supplying country 
Community, 1958-62 
Change in  Change 
$millions  % 
Europe 
Austria  +116.1  +  38.7 
Denmark  +  49.1  +  11.9 
Spain  +141.6  +103.4 
Finland  +109.1  +  52.7 
Greece  - 9.4  - 9.6 
Norway  +  59.8  +  29.5 
Portugal  +  13.6  +  19.1 
Sweden  +314.6  +  48.6 
Switzerland  +329.7  +  54.4 
Turkey  +  98.3  +109.5 
Yugoslavia  +  22.5
1  +  18.0 
Africa 
Ghana  - 7.0  - 7.2 
Morocco  - 16.2  - 7.5 
Nigeria  +  44.8
1  +  38.1 
Uganda  - 15.1  - 51.2 
Tanganyika  - 1.6  - 4.9 
Kenya  +  6.0  +  24.1 
Angola  - 2.71  - 7.9 
Sudan  +  20.5
1  +  63.3 
Tunisia  - 36.5  - 32.9 
Latin America 
Argentina  +69.4
1  +  21.0 
Chile  +35.9  +  32.6 
Costa Rica  - 2.4  - 7.8 
Ecuador  +  3.6  +  16.7 
Guatemala  +  8.6  +  38.1 
Nicaragua  - 4.0  - 15.9 
Peru  +96.7  +138.9 
Salvador  - 2.6
1  - 5.9 
Uruguay  +24.2
1  +  62.1 
Asia 
Cambodia  +  6.0
1  + 39.7 
Cyprus  - 7.3  - 31.7 
Saudi Arabia  -91.3
1  - 28.4 
Iraq  +88.4
1  +  31.3 
Iran  - 61.6
2  - 25.5 
Israel  +39.6  +126.9 
Pakistan  -12.5  - 14.6 
Syria  +28.9  +105.1 
South Vietnam  +  5.0  +  16.4 
11961  21960 
Exports to rest of 
world, 1958-62 
Change in  Change 
$millions  % 
+169.2  +  36.6 
+311.7  +  36.6 
+106.8  +  30.6 
+220.4  +  38.8 
+  26.2  +  19.6 
+169.6  +  31.3 
+  65.8  +  30.4 
+520.0  +  36.1 
+352.4  +  37.4 
+259.8  +149.1 
+104.6
1  +  33.1 
+  36.8  +  18.8 
+  29.9  +  26.1 
+  61.1 1  +  23.3 
- 0.9  - 0.9 
+  27.9  +  31.1 
+  25.2  +  37.0 
+  9.31  +  9.9 
+  33.3
1  +  36.1 
- 6.41  - 15.1 
- 99.2  - 15.0 
+107.5  +  38.6 
- 5.1  - 8.3 
- 2.01  - 2.7 
- 1.8  - 2.3 
+  23.3  +  50.7 
+151.2  +  68.1 
+  5.7
1  +  7.9 
- 15.1
1  - 15.2 
+  2.61  +  6.4 
+  15.9  + 60.9 
+  5.2.2
1  +. 9.1 
+  6.5
1  +  2.3 
+108.0
2  +  16.9 
+103.2  +  98.1 
+108.2  +  51.0 
+  26.2  +  29.1 
+  10.6  +  43.0 
Sources: ECSO monthly external-trade statistics 
UNO Directori  of International Trade, 1960. 
10 5. European Community Imports by 
economic areas 
1958  1963  Increase 
Origin  % 
$millions  1958-63 
Intra-Community trade  6,790  15,706  +131 
Total all non-member countries  16,156  24,644  +53 
Class I (Industrialized countries)  8,526  14,319  +  68 
of which:  EFT A  3,608  6,160  +  71 
United Kingdom  1,192  2,446  +105 
Other Western countries  834  1,386  +66 
North America  3,238  5,487  +  69 
of which: United States  2,808  5,036  +  79 
Class II (Developing countries)  6,824  8,816  +  29 
of which:  Overseas countries and ter-
ritories  associated  with 
European Community  1,546  1,900  +  23 
of which:  Associated  African States 
(incl. Madagascar)  914  987  +  8 
Latin  America  (South  and  Central 
America)  1,647  2,267  +  38 
Class Ill (Eastern countries)  789  1,477  +  87 
of which: Eastern Europe  678  1,362  +101 
Source: ECSO monthly external-trade statistics. 
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